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Preface 
T HIS BOOK BRINGS together papers presented at the very suc-cessful 2013 ILA Regional Conference held in Sounion, Athens on 29-31 August 2013. 
The Conference took place against the backdrop of political, social and 
economic stability, despite the pervasive underlying problems, and resulted 
in a successful exchange of views and knowledge. It also served as a meet-
ing point of both people and ideas. Lawyers and academics from all over the 
world, both established figures as well as young researchers, came together 
and discussed a great variety of issues ranging from philosophical aspects of 
the rule of law in relation to international law to technical rules of trade law. 
The quality of all the papers presented was of such a high level that the 
need was felt to publish not only the proceedings of the conference but a book. 
Thirty conference participants revised and submitted their papers for publica-
tion, making contributions of great value, and closing a gap in the existing 
literature. The book addresses important current and cross-cutting issues that 
have not been adequately dealt with together or in an interdisciplinary manner. 
Moreover, all of the issues are of relevance both academically as well as to 
practitioners of public and private international law. 
The contributions are organised into three main parts. The first addresses 
the contemporary challenges of global governance, shedding light both on the 
actors and processes as well as on the structures and factors of the international 
community. The second deals with resources in a novel way, approaching it 
both from the viewpoint of the preservation of the past, looking into cultural 
heritage, while also according the requisite importance to sharing and main-
taining the future through a disciplined approach to natural resources. Finally, 
the last part explores investment and trade from various angles. 
It is hoped that this book will help map out interactions of interrelated 
topics that are slowly coming to occupy the centre stage of the international 
law discourse. 
v 
Professor Christos Gortsos 
Vice President Hellenic Branch ILA 
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Between Flexibility and 
Stability: Ad Hoc Procedures 
and/ or judicial Institutions? 
CHIARA GIORGETTP 
I. INTRODUCTION 
T HE CHOICE BETWEEN the flexibility offered by ad hoc pro-cedures and the stability proper of established judicial institutions poses many interesting questions for those interested in international 
dispute resolution. This chapter seeks to assess some of these questions and, 
possibly, to offer suggestions to future parties and their counsel on how to 
select the most appropriate resolution mechanism to resolve their international 
inter-state dispute. I 
To begin with, it is worth noting two important and related trends that 
characterize contemporary international dispute resolution: first, the increased 
use of international litigation by diverse international actors, and second, the 
multiplication of dispute resolution mechanisms. 
Indeed, there has been a proliferation of judicial bodies in the international 
community. More, and more diverse international forums are available to par-
ties. Recently created international judicial bodies include the International 
Criminal Court, the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) 
and the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. At the same time, more 
of these forums have a very specialized jurisdiction, including the dispute 
• Associate Professor of Law, Rid1111ond Law School. The author would like to thank the 
organizers and the participants to the 2013 Regional Conference of the 1-lellcnic Branch of 
the International Law Association for their support and comments. I am also grateful to Saud 
Aldawsari of Richmond Law School for his research and editorial assistance. Email: cgiorgct@ 
richmond.cdu. 
1 In general, sec C Giorgctti (cd), The Rules, Practice and ]urispmdence of International 
Courts and Tribunals (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012). Sec also L Malintoppi, 'Methods of 
Dispute Resolution in Inter-state Litigation: When States Go to Arbitration rather than Adjudi-
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mechanism of the World Trade Organization, the European Court of Human 
Rights and the arbitration mechanism under the International Convention for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention). 
States, the principal actors in the international legal community, are increas-
ingly involved in international litigations. This can be explained simply by 
observing that, as a result of post-cold war fragmentation, there are more 
states that have ever growing reciprocal obligations and responsibilities, which 
in turn create more opportunities for disputes. 2 
In many instances, states act as respondents in international litigation-for 
example, in investment arbitration or human rights litigation-and so do not 
have a choice on the forum at the time of each dispute-the choice having 
been made (usually by treaty) beforehand. However, in inter-state situations, 
where states are in a position to choose between different forums, how should 
they decide where to go? 
The classic dichotomy is between the flexibility that ad hoc arbitral tribu-
nals offer and the stability provided by standing judicial institutions, like the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ, the Court). 
Ad hoc bodies and judicial institutions include a variety of diverse bodies, 
including: 
• judicial bodies that are permanent structures, like the ICJ and ITLOS, 
which have a variety of subject matter jurisdictions; 
quasi-judicial bodies, including institutionalized and non-institutionalized 
arbitral tribunals. The Slovenia/Croatia maritime boundary arbitration 
presently litigated under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion (PCA) is an example of the first,3 the boundary dispute resolved by the 
Taba arbitration between Egypt and Israel an example of the second;4 and 
• other diverse ad hoc bodies, like the United Nations Claims Commission 
(UNCC),5 the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundaries and Claims Commissions6 and 
2 Sec T Buergcmhal, 'Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is it Good or Bad?' 
(2001) 14 Leiden Journal of International Law 267. 
J Arbitration between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia, Arbitration Agree-
ment of 4 November 2009, available at http://www.pcacascs.com/wcb/view/3 (accessed 10 February 
2016). 
4 Award in Boundary Dispute Concerning the Taha Arca (Egypt/Isr) (1988) 27 ILM 1421; sec CS 
Copeland, 'The Use of Arbitration to Settle Territorial Disputes' (1999) 67 Fordham Law Review 
3073, available at http:l/ir.lawnct.fordham.cdu/cgi/vicwcontcnt.cgi?articlc=3585&context=flr 
(accessed on 12 February 2016). 
5 The UN Claims Commission was created by the UN Security Council for claims for com-
pensation arising out of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and brought by individuals, private 
companies, international organizations and states against Iraq. Sec, in general, TJ Feighery, 'The 
United Nations Compensation Commission; in Giorgetti (n 1 above). 
6 Eritrea and Ethiopia agreed in August 2000 to resolve their boundary dispute and claims 
arising from the 1998-2000 war by binding international arbitration. The !'CA served as registry 
to both arbitrations. Sec BO Daly, 'Permanent Court of Arbitration' in Giorgetti (n 1 above); sec 
also the PCA Case Repository, at http://www.pcacascs.com/web/ (accessed on 12 February 2016). 
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the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, created to address and resolve a specific dis-
pute.7 
When states decide to litigate their legal differences, different factors come into 
play that can move the balance in favour of arbitration or judicial institution. 
This chapter aims to highlight some of the factors that should be taken into 
consideration when choosing an international dispute settlement mechanism. 
II. FLEXIBILITY V STABILITY: THE ABILITY TO 
CHOOSE THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL 
One of the main differences between permanent judicial bodies and ad hoc 
institutions is the ability of the parties in ad hoc arbitrations to directly choose 
members of the adjudicative body charged to hear their dispute. 
At the ICJ, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and the par-
amount example of an international judicial body, judges are elected by the 
UN General Assembly and the Security Council for a renewable term of nine 
years. The 15 judges who make up the Court are recognized international 
law experts and represent different legal cultures, as well as geographical and 
(increasingly) gender diversity. 8 
The method of selection can be mitigated. Occasionally, parties also have 
the possibility of choosing their judge at the ICJ. This can happen when there 
is no judge of the same nationality of the parties. In that case, the state that 
does not have a 'national judge' can select an ad hoc judge to hear the case 
and join the other members of the Court. Similarly, parties can ask to have 
their case heard by a five-member chamber. In that-rare-occasion, parties 
can suggest certain members of the Court and their opinion carry consider-
able weight in the final decision. 
Conversely, in arbitration, parties always choose at least some of the mem-
bers of the tribunal. Generally, arbitration panels are constituted by three 
arbitrators, each party selecting one arbitrator and the third-and presid-
ing-arbitrator being selected either by the two parties themselves or by an 
appointing authority. In more complex cases, such as many boundary disputes, 
the arbitral tribunal may be constituted of five members, and the mechanism 
for selection generally docs not change. Each party selects two arbitrators, 
and the presiding arbitrator is chosen either by agreement between the two 
parties or by a designated appointing authority. This selection process affords 
7 The Iran-US Claims Tribunals was created in 1981 by agreement of the parties through the 
mediation of Algeria to hear individual and sovereign claims between Iran and the US. Sec, in 
general, .JK Sharpe, 'Iran-United States Claims 1i·ibunal' in Giorgetti (n 1 above). 
8 Sec !CJ Statute, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documcnts/?p I =4&p2=2&p3=0 (accessed 
12 i'cbruary 2016). On the !CJ in general sec also SD Murphy, 'The International Court of Jus-
tice' in Giorgctti (n I above). 
( 
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parties the possibility of choosing arbitrators with specific qualities, including 
expertise, legal background and languages spoken. 
The ability to choose arbitrators is consistently seen by parties as a fun-
damental feature in favour of arbitration. Parties consistently report that the 
ability to appoint an arbitrator in international arbitration is a key reason for 
them to choose that mechanism. 
III. FLEXIBILITY ON RULES OF PROCEDURES 
A particular advantage of arbitration over international judicial institutions 
is that parties can choose their own rules of procedures if they so wish, and 
tailor them to the specific needs of a specific case. 
To a certain extent, this can also be done at the ICJ with a compromis-
but some rules would still apply in ICJ proceedings (including, for example, 
Articles 62 and 63 ICJ Statute on third-party intervention, and Article 41 
Statute on provisional measures9). 
At the same time, drafting detailed procedural rules is time consuming 
and complex, and requires expert counsel. Parties and their counsel need to 
consider many issues, including schedule, possible bi- or tri-furcation of pro-
ceedings, sequence and timing of pleadings, organization of proceedings, rules 
of evidence (including those applying to witnesses), logistical aspects, lan-
guage, translation of documents and challenges of arbitrators. 
Most often, parties in ad hoc proceedings apply the UNCITRAL Rules. 10 
The paragraphs below highlight some of the procedural issues in which the 
choice of the parties in respect of a specific forum matters most. 
A. Length of Proceedings 
The ICJ is often criticized because of the length of its proceedings. The prac-
tice of the court has been to fix fairly long time limits for the filing of written 
pleadings. For example, in the Oil Platforms case1l-filed by Iran in 1992 
against the United States-the hearings were held in 2002 and the judgment 
on the merits rendered in 2003 (11 years after the case was initially filed). One 
important consideration is that even at the ICJ the parties can, to a large 
extent, decide the timetable of the proceedings. There are, however, more 
procedural constraints, for example third party intervention. 
Conversely, parties can really speed up proceedings if they so choose. This 
9 All available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documcnts/?pl =4&p2=2&p3=0. 
10 Available at http://pca-cpa.orp/showpagc.asp?pa(Lid= 1064. 
11 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of lra11 v United States of America), a timclinc of the 
case, as well as all the decisions, is available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/?p1=3&p2=3&cas 
e=90&c.:ode=op&p3=4. 
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happened in the Eritrea/Yemen maritime dispute and Eritrea/Ethiopia bound-
ary proceedings, in which the parties opted for a particularly expedite schedule: 
1. Eritrea/Yemen: 11 months for simultaneous exchange of memorials, two 
months for the replies, three months after that oral proceedings were held. 
The tribunal was asked to, as far as possible, deliver the award within three 
months from the end of the oral proceedings. The entire arbitration took 
only three years.12 
2. The Eritrea/Ethiopia Boundary Commission was also organized on a tight 
schedule, which the parties respected-three months to file simultaneous 
memorials, three months for an exchange of counter-memorials and one 
month for replies. The award was issued by the tribunal equally expedi-
tiously.13 
In other cases the parties have also decided to request the tribunal to issue 
the award within a limited amount of time and have imposed specific time 
limits on the tribunal. 
B. Terms of Reference of the Tribunal 
In ad hoc proceedings, parties can agree on specific terms of reference for the 
arbitral tribunal, which establish the issues to be decided by the tribunal. At 
the ICJ, this can be done at the time when the parties submit their dispute 
to the ICJ through a mutually agreed conzpromis. 
C. Number and Types of Parties 
Ad hoc proceedings allow unique flexibility in terms of the number of par-
ties that can be brought into proceedings. For example, at the UNCC, Iraq 
was a sui generis respondent in cases brought by individuals, international 
organizations and states, and cases involved mass claims as well as single and 
multi-party claims. 
IV. CHOOSING BETWEEN CONFIDENTIALITY AND PUBLICITY 
One important difference between international ad hoc proceedings and pro-
ceedings in judicial institutions is confidentiality of proceedings. At the ICJ 
and in other established proceedings, hearings are open to the public and all 
submissions-written and oral-as well as all of the Court's decisions, are 
12 In general, sec PCA Past Cases (n 6 above). 
13 Ibid. 
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published and readily available from the ICJ website once the hearings are 
finished. 
Conversely, in ad hoc proceedings, parties can choose to keep some (eg writ-
ten pleadings or oral pleadings) or all of the proceedings confidential. Indeed, 
the existence of the entire dispute could be kept confidential. This could be of 
interest especially for politically sensitive issues or to limit possible drawbacks 
for payments of any future award. 
Thus, in sensitive cases, arbitration may be preferable. Parties can decide if 
and what to open to the public-like the parties choose to do in the Abey Arbi-
tration between Sudan and the Sudan's People Liberation Movement/ Army. 14 
In a recent arbitration between the US and Ecuador, the parties agreed to 
make the pleadings public, but not the award.15 
V. FLEXIBILITY ON APPLICABLE LAW 
Parties in ad hoc proceedings also have a certain flexibility to determine the 
applicable law to their dispute. 
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute provides the generally recognized enumeration 
of sources of law for international disputes. It provides that: 
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply; 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means 
for the determination of rules of law.16 
In special cases, parties can direct the tribunal to use a specific body of law. 
For example, in the Eritrea/Ethiopia boundary dispute, the parties asked the 
tribunal to delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty borders between them 
based on the pertinent colonial treaties (1900, 1902 and 1908) and applicable 
international law.17 
The flexibility to determine the applicable law can be an important argu-
ment in favour of ad hoc arbitration in certain cases in which the parties have 
a predetermined and agreed body of law that they wish to apply. However, 
choosing the applicable law is no simple matter, and may not be preferable 
in many other contests. 
14 Ibid. 
I.I Documents for both proceedings arc available at the website of the l'CA, ibid, which acted 
as registry in both cases. 
16 Art 38, !CJ Statute, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/documcnts/?p 1=4&p2=2&p3=0 
17 For the award and arbitration agreement sec l'CA Past Cases (n 6 above). 
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VI. FLEXIBILITY V. STABILITY: THE BINDING NATURE OF THE 
AWARD, ENFORCEABILITY AND POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES 
Judgments and awards are always final and binding for the parties. Critics, 
however, point out that international law lacks an enforcement mechanism 
similar to the police force found in domestic law. The truth is that, as Louis 
Henkin famously wrote in 1979, 'almost all nations observe almost all princi-
ples of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the 
time' .18 Equally, parties to international disputes respect and apply the final 
decisions rendered by an international court or tribunal almost of all the time. 
All parties have a mutual advantage in respecting international judicial deci-
sions. They are, of course, also legally obligated to do so by international law, 
whether as members of the United Nation or by the agreement they signed to 
go to arbitration. Failure to comply, therefore, can result in state responsibil-
ity for international law violation. 
The UN Charter provides at Article 94 that parties must 'comply with the 
decision of the IC]' and 
if any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under the 
IC] judgment, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which 
may, if it deems necessary, make recommendation or decide upon measures to be 
taken to give effect to the judgmenr. 19 
Thus, the Security Council can be called upon to play a role in enforcing an 
ICJ judgment. An important problem, however, is the exercise of a veto by 
one of the veto-holding members of the Security Council, which could block 
any enforcement effort. Famously, for example, the US used its veto power to 
block the enforcement of an ICJ judgment in a case that Nicaragua brought 
against the us. 20 
This is more problematic in arbitration, which lacks an immediate link to 
the Security Council. A reference to an enforcing role of the United Nations 
could, and should, be included in the terms of reference of the tribunal. 
Where enforceability may be problematic from the start, established judicial 
bodies like the ICJ may thus present an advantage. 
Established judicial bodies are also preferable when tribunals are needed 
after the judgment is issued, for example if a clarification, correction or inter-
pretation is needed by the parties. In arbitration, the arbitral tribunal ceases 
to exist after the award is issued, making it difficult for it to reconvene to 
hear a post-award request. Differently, the statute of the ICJ includes specific 
provisions for such situations, thus providing added stability. 
18 L Henkin, How Nations Behave (Columbia University Press, 1979). 
19 Art 94, UN Charter, available at http://www.un.org. 
211 Military and l'ammilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nie v USA)-IC.J .Judgment 
of 27 June 1986. I'or the cxcn.:isc of the veto power, sec UN Security Council, draft resolution, 
UN Doc S/18428, 28 October 1986, vetoed by the US; UN Security Council meeting 2718, ver-
batim record, in UN Doc S/PV.2718, 28 October 1986. 
18 Chiara Giorgetti 
VII. CONCLUSION 
International dispute resolution nowadays offers a real menu of options to 
prospective litigants. The choice of forum in international litigation is a fun-
damental decision, with important repercussions for the parties. Any such 
decision must therefore be carefully considered by the parties. 
Different forums have different functions and may appeal to different liti-
gants. In general, international dispute resolution is quite flexible and parties 
have substantial freedom. 
Flexibility can play an important role when parties agree to settle their dis-
pute by a binding international law mechanism, and parties can choose specific 
rules of procedures and applicable law, and-most importantly-have a say 
on who decides their dispute by selecting members of the tribunal directly. To 
go to arbitration, states must recognize the existence of a legal dispute and 
be willing to have it resolved through arbitration. 
Standing tribunals like the ICJ have important and unique functions: they 
provide for compulsory jurisdiction and their public forum may validate deci-
sions for domestic constituencies. Judgments of standing tribunals may also 
result in better enforceability. 
Sometimes, of course, there is no choice, as there is no standing forum 
that has jurisdiction over the specific dispute. Also, sometimes (albeit rarely) 
there is only limited choice-a dispute resolution clause may only allow for 
one forum. In certain situations, arbitration may also be the only option. For 
example, Article 287 UNCLOS provides that if a party has not chosen by a 
written statement one of the three settlerrr~nt methods listed or if the parties 
have not chosen the same method, the dispute will be resolved by arbitration. 
Cost is also always an important consideration, as arbitration can be much 
more costly then the ICJ, where the cost of the court and the registry is not 
paid by the parties. 
